Résumé
Cette étude s'intéresse à la relation entre la qualité 
Introduction
Previous research shows that there has been much debate over audit quality. DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the probability that the auditor will both detect and report a breach in the contract to provide fair accounting information. However, recent empirical researchers suggest that big audit firms guarantee audit quality. Becker et al. (1998) found that the firms audited by Big 4 had lower discretionary accruals in the United States than the firms audited by Non-Big 4. Palmrose (1988) analysed the relation between the audit litigation and the audit service quality. He reported that audits by the Big 4 (ex-Big 8) were less likely to result in litigation. In summary, audit quality is associated to the Big 4 brand name.
The failure of Enron was announced at the end of 2001. Andersen Houston Office played a significant role in this scandal. Three reactions were noted after this failure. The first one concerns the reaction of the financial market. Cahan and Zhang (2006) The goal of this paper is to study the relationship between the characteristics of institutional investors and audit quality in France after the Enron scandal. Empirical results make a major contribution to auditing literature. We find a negative relation between French institutional investors and Big 4 appointment after the Enron collapse. This means that, if the French institutional investor has a majority ownership, the probability of hiring the Big 4 decreases after the Enron scandal. We also find an insignificant positive relation between the choice of the Big 4 and foreign institutional investors in France after Enron's failure. This result confirms that foreign institutional investor perceived Big 4 as the suppliers of audit quality even after Enron failure at the end of 2001.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the legal audit reforms after the Enron scandal in France. Section 3 develops hypotheses concerning the choice of auditors and the characteristics of institutional investors in France. Section 4 presents the sample and methodology, and section 5 shows the empirical results. The last section summarizes the empirical findings and serves as a conclusion.
The failure of Enron and the audit profession in France
The Enron Corporation was founded in 1985. The main activity of this corporation was the distribution of natural gas by pipeline in the United States (Helay and Palepu, 2003 Enron was announced, Andersen's brand name was negatively affected. Krishnamurthy, Zhou, and Zhou (2002) found that the market reacted more negatively than when the news about Andersen was announced. Moreover, they note that the market reacted more negatively to Andersen's clients than to other Big 4 auditors' clients. Cahan and Zhang (2006) 
Audit quality and characteristics of institutional investors
Most of recent studies show that audit is an important mechanism of corporate governance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) demonstrated that audit reduces the likelihood of information asymmetries between investors and managers. Palmrose (1988) found that the audit report is a key factor in the reaction of the market. But this depends on the auditor's reputation.
Theoretical and empirical backgrounds detected the differences in audit practices between large and small audit firms. For this reason, recent studies dealt with the concept of audit quality. DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the probability that the auditor will both detect and report a breach in the contract to provide fair accounting information.
Independence and competence are two main characteristics of audit quality. All the latest research on audit quality confirms that the Big 4 offer audit quality more than small audit firms. Becker et al. (1998) demonstrated that firms audited by the Big 4 benefit from better audit quality than those audited by the Non-Big 4 group. That was due to many reasons. For example, the Big 4 have the human and financial resources. These two factors affect auditor's skills.
Prior archival audit studies focused on the demand for auditing (DeFond, 1992; Francis and Wilson, 1988; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) (Gillan and Starks 2000) . Otherwise, the presence of institutional investor became the important characteristic of financial market. For example, the public pension fund began to abandon their traditional monitoring role and became more active in corporate governance.
This role increase when the conflict of interest is very significant between manager and shareholders. The institutional investors use their ownership to pressure manager to act in the best of the shareholders. Maug (1998) notes that the decision of institutional investor is partially a function of share held by this group of investor. McConnell and Servaes (1990) find that the ownership of institutional investor is positively associated to the firm performance measured by the Tobin's Q. Generally, major of last researches confirm this relation. Contrary to this conclusion, Chen et al. (2006) suggests that institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds) provide little monitoring in China context. It is clear that the role of institutional investor varied throught every context.
According to the security Rule, the institutional investor are composed from banks, insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds (Bushee, 1998) .
The presence of institutional investors in the ownership structure influences the way in which activity is monitored in the corporation. As a whole, institutional investors try to control their investment. They are the most informed about the corporation's situation. To evaluate their portfolio choice, institutional investors needs credible accounting information. The annual report is the main source of credible information. Prior studies found that audit report and financial statements provided a clear signal on firm health and performance (Dye, 1993; Willenborg, 1999; O'Reilly, Leitch and Tuttle, 2006) . This signal influences the market reaction and depends from auditor brand name and audit firm reputation. Wall Street Journal, 1995 , 1996 , 1997 . This monitor increase when the environment is characterized by the less legal protection. In this way, Kane and Velury (2004) 
Control variables
Focusing on previous research we use variables related to firm characteristics in our model.
Building on the study of Broy and Weill (2008) , we use long term debt (LTD) to control the effect of credit organism on the choice of auditor. The latest empirical studies found a positive relation between large audit firm and long term debt in the United States context (Francis and Willson 1988; Eichenscher and Shield 1989; DeFond 1992; Reed et al. 2000) . Finally, we use return on assets (ROA) as an additional indicator of firm risk.
Results

Descriptive statistics and Univariate analyses
Insert Table 2 Table (2) The mean of the leverage ratio is equal to 14.8 % of the sample (table 1) . The leverage ratio before and after Enron collapse of the enterprises audited by the non-Big 4 is more than the firms audited by Big 4. We document that the leverage level of the enterprises audited by the two leaders decrease. We note also, that more than the half of the enterprises audited by Big 4 has their age more than 33 years old. The mean of the growth sales of the firms audited by small audit firms is equal to 16%. 50 % of the corporations audited by large audit firm have the percentage less of the 74.30%. 26.9% of the firms of our sample are listed on more one market. For the firms audited by Big 4, this percentage is equal to 32.6% and only 13.6 % for the firms audited by non-Big 4. The mean of the return on assets of the all sample is equal to 5.6%. For the total risk, we note that is approximately the same for corporation audited by the two leaders of audit.
Insert Table 6 5.2 Regression Results Insert Table 7 Insert Table 8 The limit of our univariate analysis is that it ignores a number of control variables that can affect our result, for this reason we performed multivariate analyses. France. In conclusion, our second hypothesis associated to the relation between the foreign institutional investor and the appointment of large audit firms is not supported in the context that characterized by the lack of investor protection compared to common Low Countries according to La Porta et al. (1999) . This means that the perception of the institutional investor is a function of the audit role in every context. For example in the United States and Canada, audit is conceived as the insurance mechanism in the deep-pocket theory (Piot, 2005) . Even more, operating risk is positively and significantly correlated to the choice of the Big 4.
This empirical result means that, in France, the corporations which have operating risks hire the Big 4 before after Enron's failure. Moreover, the firms listed on more than one financial market are positively and significantly associated to the choice of the Big 4 before and after Arthur Andersen's scandal. This means that if the firm is listed on more than one financial market, the probability of hiring one of the Big 4 decreased with 18%. The marginal effect of firms listed on more than one market decreased by 5% after the Enron scandal. Total risk is negatively and insignificant associated to the choice of the Big 4 before and before and after the Enron scandal, this result is consistent with previous research. Palmrose (1988) showed that the firms audited by the Big 4 had a lower risk of litigation. Return on assets is negatively and insignificantly related to the choice of the Big 4, which is the same result as the result obtained by Broy and Weill (2008) . This result suggests that firms appointing the Big 4 are relatively riskier than firms audited by the Non-Big 4.
Conclusion
Through the world, large audit firms or Big 4 are considered the suppliers of audit quality.
Most of previous research confirms this result. Becker et al. (1998) found that the firms audited by the Big 4 had lower discretionary accruals in the United States than the firms audited by the Non-Big 4. Palmrose (1988) reported that the audits by the Big 4 (ex-Big 8)
were less likely to result in litigation. To sum up, according to the latest research, audit quality is related to the Big 4 brand name.
At the end of 2001, when Enron's failure was announced, the role of Arthur Andersen L.L.P, one of the largest financial services through the world, in this scandal was very significant. 
